moral issues- discuss

Ruth Barcan Marcus

Moral dilemmas

Feb 21st 2012, by E.G. | AUSTIN

  T Economist

THE American philosopher Ruth Barcan Marcus died on Sunday. Although best known as a logician, she did a lot of work in moral philosophy, and her work on moral dilemmas is worth revisiting. This month has seen a surge in political rhetoric over values, particularly in relation to abortion, with each side apparently feeling that the other is being largely unreasonable. Some social liberals feel that social conservatives are actually opposed to women's health, rights and autonomy; some social conservatives feel that liberals don't care about families or children, at least not when such concerns are inconvenient. You can find a bit of bad faith on both extremes, as a moderate on either side of the line would probably agree that there is some room for reasonable people to reasonably disagree.

I had this context in mind when looking at Marcus's widely cited paper, "Moral Dilemmas and Consistency". She argues that moral dilemmas are real (as opposed to an accidental outcome of our failure to develop an internally consistent moral outlook), and that although we may be tempted to try to break through a dilemma by asserting more certainty than we actually feel—in other words, by asserting that there is no real problem, only an incomplete understanding—that's an ultimately unsatisfying shortcut. With regard to abortion, for example, she notes that people marshal a variety of arguments, some of which reference competing claims (such as the right of the fetus to live, or the right of a woman to control her own body), and some of which make prima facie claims (such as that a fetus is not a human, or that it is). She continues:

What all the arguments seem to share is the assumption that there is, despite uncertainty, a resolution without residue; that there is a correct set of metaphysical claims, principles, and priority rankings of principles which will justify the choice. Then, given the belief that one choice is justified, assignment of guilt relative to the overridden alternative is seen as inappropriate, and feelings of guilt or pangs of conscience are viewed as, at best, sentimental. But as one tries to unravel the tangle of arguments, it is clear that to insist there is in every case a solution without residue is false to the moral facts.

I think she's on to something here. Our desire for things to be morally clear-cut often exceeds the degree to which they are clear-cut. Individuals have varying degrees of awareness and acceptance of this. Some will accept that the dilemma exists and is difficult, although that doesn't tell us much about how they will respond; some will try to avoid the dilemma as far as possible; others are willing to get their hands dirty. People with a higher threshold for doubt, however, will push back by doubling down on the prima facie claims ("But a fetus is/is not a person!").

In American politics, it's the latter group of people who typically seek access to the system. A person who believes the prima facie claim is more likely to be an activist than someone who's a little more iffy. You hardly ever see interest groups coalescing around the fact that the members have conflicting intuitions, and asking the candidates to pledge that they will remain agnostic about an issue because we're really not sure and it's not necessarily our place to judge. This might be one of the reasons why American political rhetoric tends to be overheated or slightly paranoid. The good news is that the more temperate heads haven't disappeared. They're just not so likely to turn up on talk radio.